Date when decision was rendered: 22.6.1992

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 2456; 244 and 286/1/91

Reference to source

KHO 1992-A-1.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1992 A, General Part

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1992 A, allmän del

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1992 A, yleinen osa

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 1993

Pages: pp. 9-27

Subject

access to court, right to property, equality before the law,
rätt till domstolsprövning, äganderätt, likhet inför lagen,
oikeus tuomioistuinkäsittelyyn, omistusoikeus, tasa-arvoisuus lain edessä,

Relevant legal provisions

Sections 3 and 4-1 of the Administrative Appeals Act, section 41 of the Constitution Act (and unspecified references to Sections 5 and 6), sections 13, 246-1 and 47 of the Standing Orders of the Council of State

= lag om ändringssökande i förvaltningsärenden 3 § och 4 § 1 mom., regeringsformen 41 § (och ospecificerade hänvisningar till 5 § och 6 §), reglemente för statsrådet 13 §, 246 § 1 mom. och 47 §

= laki muutoksenhausta hallintoasioissa 3 § ja 4 § 1 mom., hallitusmuoto 41 § (ja määrittelemättömät viitteet 5 § ja 6 §),valtioneuvoston ohjesääntö 13 §, 246 § 1 mom. ja 47 §.

ECHR-6-1 (unspecified); ECHRP-1-1 (unspecified)

Abstract

Riparian owners had the right to challenge, in the Supreme Administrative Court, the lawfulness of a national shore conservation plan approved by the Cabinet.After examining the merits of complaints by certain owners, the Court upheld the plan.

The Council of State, ie. the Cabinet, had in December 1990 approved a national shore conservation plan.The Supreme Administrative Court ruled that this decision had consequences of legal relevance for riparian owners, and that the owners therefore had the right to appeal against the Cabinet decision.The Court cited the petition of appeal filed by a group of land owners who were of the opinion that the decision violated the constitutional provisions on the right to property and on equality before the law, as well as international treaties on human rights binding on Finland.According to the ruling of the Court, the Cabinet had neither exceeded its authority nor committed a procedural error.The Cabinet decision did not have such immediate effects on the position of the land owners that it therefore would have been unlawful.There existed sufficient reasons for including the shore areas owned by the applicants in the conservation plan.The Supreme Administrative Court therefore came to the conclusion that the Cabinet decision did not infringe the rights of the applicants.

23.3.1998 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 26.5.1993

Judicial body: Vaasa Court of Appeal = Vasa hovrätt = Vaasan hovioikeus

Reference: Report No. 1031; R92/1295

Reference to source

VaaHO 1994:10.

Electronic database FHOT within the FINLEX databank system, administered by the Finnish Ministry of Justice

Databasen FHOT inom FINLEX-databassystemet, vilket administreras av justitieministeriet

Oikeusministeriön ylläpitämän FINLEX tietopankin FHOT-tietokanta

Date of publication:

Subject

non-discrimination, equality before the law,
icke-diskriminering, likhet inför lagen,
syrjintäkielto, tasa-arvoisuus lain edessä,

Relevant legal provisions

section 5 of the Constitution Act; Temporary Act on Community Service

= regeringsformen 5 §; lag om försöksverksamhet med samhällstjänst

= hallitusmuoto 5 §; laki yhdyskuntapalvelun kokeilemisesta.

ECHR (unspecified), UDHR (unspecified)

Abstract

Parliament had enacted a Temporary Act on Community Service (No. 1105 of 1990), for a trial period of three years and to be applied by certain courts as a discretionary alternative to imprisonment.The Vaasa Court of Appeal stated that such a law was in breach of the principle of equal treatment.Therefore, the Act had been approved in a specific qualified procedure as an exception to the equality clause in section 5 of the Constitution Act.The principle of equal treatment, as guaranteed in the ECHR and the UDHR, was, however, not violated to the extent that the punishment of community service, for the sake of equality, should be used also by other courts than those stipulated by the Act.The appeal of the defendant, asking to be sentenced to community service, was therefore dismissed.

27.3.1998 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 28.12.1998

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report No. 2953/1998 (2992/3/96)

Reference to source

KHO 1998:78.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 1998 July-December

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 1998 juli-december

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 1998 heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Administrative Court

Date of publication: 1999

Pages: pp. 335-343

Subject

freedom of movement, equality before the law,
rörelsefrihet, likhet inför lagen,
liikkumisvapaus, tasa-arvoisuus lain edessä,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 5 and 7 of the Constitution Act; Act on Structural Policy Measures in Agriculture and Forestry (1303/1994); Government Ordinance on Compensating Permanent Natural Disadvantage (861/1995)

= regeringsformen 5 §, 7 §; lag om strukturpolitiska åtgärder inom jord- och skogsbruk (1303/1994); statsrådets beslut om kompensation för varaktiga naturbetingade nackdelar (861/1995)

= hallitusmuoto 5 §, 7 §; laki maa- ja metsätalouden rakennepoliittisista toimenpiteistä (1303/1994); valtioneuvoston päätös pysyvän luonnonhaitan korvaamisesta (861/1995).

ECHRP-4-2; Council Regulation (EEC) 2328/91; Council Directive 75/268/EEC

Abstract

According to a Government Ordinance, a land owner could apply for certain European Union subsidies provided that he did not live farther away from the farm than 12 kilometres.The European Court of Justice had, in the joined cases C-9/97 and C-118/97, found that the fact that a person did not live on the farm did not prevent the granting of the subsidy in question, provided that certain conditions were met.According to the Supreme Administrative Court, the requirement that a person must live closer to the farm than 12 kilometres was not against European Community Law.The Court dismissed also the claim that the said requirement was in conflict with the constitutional clause on equality before the law (section 5 of the Constitution Act) or the provisions on freedom of movement in the ECHR (Article 2 of Protocol No. 4) or the Constitution Act (section 7).

23.10.2002 / 11.4.2007 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 27.2.2009

Judicial body: Supreme Administrative Court = Högsta förvaltningsdomstolen = Korkein hallinto-oikeus

Reference: Report no. 442; 1966/1/07

Reference to source

KHO 2009:24.

Yearbook of the Supreme Administrative Court 2009 January-June

Högsta förvaltningsdomstolens årsbok 2009 januari-juni

Korkeimman hallinto-oikeuden vuosikirja 2009 tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2010

Pages: pp. 225-233

Subject

social rights, right to property, right to housing, equality before the law,
sociala rättigheter, äganderätt, rätt till bostad, likhet inför lagen,
sosiaaliset oikeudet, omistusoikeus, oikeus asuntoon, tasa-arvoisuus lain edessä,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 1, 2, 7b, 7c, 10c and 11 of the Act on client fees in social welfare and health care; sections 1 and 15 of the Decree on client fees in social welfare and health care; sections 6-1, 15-1 and 22 of the Constitution Act

= lag om klientavgifter inom social- och hälsovården 1 §, 2 §, 7b §, 7c §, 10c § och 11 §; förordning om klientavgifter inom social- och hälsorvården 1 § och 15 §; grundlagen 6 § 1 mom., 15 § 1 mom. och 22 §

= laki sosiaali- ja terveydenhuollon asiakasmaksuista 1 §, 2 §, 7b §, 7c §, 10c § ja 11 §; asetus sosiaali- ja terveydenhuollon asiakasmaksuista 1 § ja 15 §; perustuslaki 6 § 1 mom., 15 § 1 mom. ja 22 §.

ECHRP-1-1

Abstract

A municipal social welfare board had made a policy decision to the effect that persons in long-term institutional care would be charged a client fee in accordance with the Act on client fees in social welfare and health care, but the person's costs of living in rented or owner-occupied home would no longer be taken into account when determining the amoung of the fee.X asked the board to rectify its decision, claiming that the decision had no basis in law and was in conflict with several constitutional rights, among them equality before the law, the protection of property and the right to housing.The board rejected X's request.When the administrative court had rejected X's appeal, X filed an appeal in the Supreme Administrative Court.

In its decision, the Supreme Administrative Court noted that the municipalities can determine the amount of client fees within the limits prescribed in the Act and Decree on client fees in social welfare and health care.According to the Act, those in long-term institutional care will be charged a fee which is set taking into consideration the person's solvency and monthly income.The Act also lists the costs that are to be deducted from the monthly income before determining the amount of the fee.Housing costs are not mentioned among such costs.In taking housing costs into consideration when determining the client fee for persons in long-term institutional care, the social welfare board had thus granted an additional benefit as compared to the provisions of the Act.The Supreme Administrative Court found that in making the decision and in reversing it later, the board had not exceeded its discretion or authority.In the Court's opinion, the board's decision was not contrary to law nor in conflict with the protection of property as prescribed in the Constitution Act and the First Additional Protocol to the ECHR or with the constitutional provisions on equality and non-discrimination.The Court continued by pointing out that the Act on client fees also provides for the possibility to waive or reduce a client fee, for example, if collecting the fee would jeopardize a person's income or the income of that person's family.The Court concluded that, by its policy decision, the board had not conclusively resolved whether housing costs could be deducted from the monthly income before determining the amount of the fee.Rather, this question is considered on a case-by-case basis.Moreover, the decision by which a client fee is determined can be appealed under the Act on client fees.The Supreme Administrative Court rejected X's appeal.

23.11.2009 / 21.10.2010 / RHANSKI

Date when decision was rendered: 20.12.2007

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report no. 2874; R2007/389

Reference to source

KKO 2007:98.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2007 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2007 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2007 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2008

Pages: pp. 520-524

Subject

equality before the law, fair trial,
likhet inför lagen, rättvis rättegång,
tasa-arvoisuus lain edessä, oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti,

Relevant legal provisions

sections 75 and 78 of the Road Traffic Act; chapter 7, section 6 of the Penal Code; section 6 of the Constitution Act

= vägtrafiklag 75 § och 78 §; strafflagen 7 kapitel 6 §; grundlagen 6 §

= tieliikennelaki 75 § ja 78 §; rikoslaki 7 luku 6 §; perustuslaki 6 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

X had been guilty of aggravated drunken driving and had been temporarily banned from driving.By its decision of 4 May 2006, the court of first instance had ended the driving ban which had at that time lasted for 10 months.While the temporary driving ban was still in force, X had again been guilty of aggravated drunken driving.By its decision of 3 October 2006, the court of first instance sentenced X to community service and a driving ban for 17 months.According to the Road Traffic Act, the minimum length of a driving ban is one year if the driver has been found guilty of aggravated drunken driving twice within five years.However, in this case the court of appeal shortened the second driving ban to six months.As grounds for its decision, the court of appeal stated, among other things, that the case concerning the second driving ban could have been decided by the court of first instance at the same time the court made its decision concerning the first driving ban in May 2006.Under chapter 7 of the Penal Code concerning joint punishment, an earlier sentence of imprisonment can be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance or as a ground for reducing the punishment for a new offence.The court of appeal held that the principle of equality before the law, as prescribed in section 6 of the Constitution Act, and the right to a fair trial, as provided for in Article 6 of the ECHR, require that the principle of joint pumishment is also applied to driving bans.

The Supreme Court did not agree with the court of appeal.It noted that a driving ban is not a punishment but a preventive measure taken, among other things, in order to promote road traffic safety.The provisions in chapter 7 of the Penal Code are not applicable to driving bans and there are no corresponding provisions according to which a previous driving ban could be taken into account when imposing a new driving ban.The Supreme Court also found that while Article 6 of the ECHR sets the procedural requirements for a fair trial, the main issue in this case was not of procedure but of the application of law.The Court admitted that it is possible that the total length of a driving ban varies depending on whether repeated offences of drunken driving are decided in one and the same trial or not.However, determining the length of a driving ban is a matter of discretion based on various considerations.According to the Road Traffic Act, the minimum length of a driving ban, imposed on an offender who is guilty of aggravated drunken driving for the second time in five years, is one year and the maximum punishment is five years, irrespective of the fact whether both cases are decided in the same trial or not.Within these fairly loose limits, a court can determine the length of a driving ban in the light of the circumstances in each individual case.The Supreme Court concluded that, in accordance with the Road Traffic Act, the length of the second driving ban imposed on X should be one year at the minimum.The Court then took into account the six months imposed by the court of appeal and added thereto a driving ban of seven months.

28.4.2010 / 18.10.2012 / RHANSKI